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How does education change the relationship between fertility and 
age-dependency under environmental constraints?  
A long-term simulation exercise 
Erich Striessnig1  
Wolfgang Lutz2 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
When asked what a desirable fertility level for populations might be, most politicians, 
journalists, and even social scientists would say it is around two children per woman, a 
level that has been labelled by demographers “replacement-level fertility.” The reasons 
given for considering this level of fertility as something to aim at usually include 
maintaining the size of the labour force and stabilizing the old-age-dependency ratio.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
In this paper, we scrutinize this wide-spread view by introducing education in addition 
to age and sex as a further relevant source of observable population heterogeneity. We 
consider several criteria for assessing the long-term implications of alternative fertility 
levels and present numerical simulations with a view on minimizing the education-
weighted total dependency ratio and complement this with the goal of reducing the 
amount of greenhouse gas emission in the context of climate change. 
 
METHODS 
We perform thousands of alternative simulations for different fertility levels (assumed 
to be constant over time) starting from empirically given population structures and 
derive the rate of fertility which yields the lowest level of our education-weighted 
dependency ratio. We study the sensitivity of our results to different parameter values 
and choose to focus on the actual populations of Europe and China over the course of 
the 21st century. 
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RESULTS 
The results show that when education is assumed to present a cost at young age and 
results in higher productivity during adult age, then the fertility rate that on the long run 
keeps dependency at a minimum turns out to lie well below replacement fertility both in 
Europe and in China under a set of plausible assumptions. The optimal fertility level 
falls even lower when climate change is factored in as well. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that there is nothing magical or particularly desirable about replacement 
level fertility. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Many scientific and public discussions about demographic trends in low fertility 
countries are based on the implicit assumption that somehow replacement level fertility 
(RLF) is the most desirable long-term fertility level for any nation state. This leads to 
the popular view in Germany that fertility was too low, whereas in France it was about 
right. Consequently, newspaper headlines in those countries often claim that family 
policies were not reaching their goals because they failed to raise fertility to RLF. But 
this view is also reflected in official UN compendia about government views on 
demographic trends (UN Population Division 2011; Vobecká, Butz,and Reyes 2013). 
This normative view about what is the most desirable long-term level of fertility 
shows an interesting interaction with the long-term fertility assumptions in international 
population projections. For decades the UN population projections have – with only 
minor variations – consistently assumed that in the long run all populations of the world 
will converge to RLF. While this assumption has likely been inspired by political 
desirability of a view where in the long run there will be a global population 
equilibrium, with no populations shrinking and none increasing, it is also plausible to 
assume that the pervasiveness of this long-term population assumption has in turn 
influenced what people consider to be the norm. If a country sees itself below or above 
the medium path as projected by the UN, then it may think that its fertility is either too 
low or too high under a normative perspective. 
In this paper, we will question this ubiquitous normative belief that RLF is 
somehow the ultimate goal. We will do so by discussing and specifying clear criteria 
for what is desirable and then simulate the long-term consequences of alternative 
fertility levels with respect to these criteria. When doing this we will go beyond the 
conventional rather narrow view of population dynamics by age and sex and instead 
apply models that have been developed more recently, integrating population dynamics 
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in three dimensions, namely age, sex, and level of educational attainment. This new 
multi-dimensional approach has recently been summarized by Lutz and KC (2011). 
Therefore, we only provide a brief illustration for the case of South Korea, where – as 
in many other low fertility countries – the question arises as to whether the smaller 
number of young people can be compensated for in terms of aggregate economic 
wellbeing by their better education (compare Lee and Mason 2010). The example of 
Korea is a rather extreme case due to the very low level of fertility and the very rapid 
recent expansion of educational attainment as illustrated in the projection for 2020 by 
age, sex, and level of education in Figure 1. Here the different colours refer to men and 
women by highest level of educational attainment as indicated by the legend at the 
bottom of the figure. The government of Korea is clearly very concerned about the 
currently low level of fertility. At the IUSSP International Population Conference in 
Busan in August 2013, hundreds of provincial and local level “family consultants” or 
social workers attended seeking more information about how to convince couples to 
have more children. There seemed to be a general conviction that the low level of 
fertility posed a major threat to the future of the country. 
 
Figure 1: Population by age, sex, and education. Republic of Korea, 2020 
 
Source: Lutz and KC 2011 
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As shown in the figure, the age pyramid of Korea is indeed becoming extremely 
narrow at the bottom. In 2020 the age group 0-4 will be less than half of the size of the 
age group 45-49. This is because South Korea has had a TFR (total fertility rate) of 
roughly 1.2, one of the world’s lowest, for some time now. On the other hand, Korea 
has experienced one of the fastest expansions of the educational composition of its 
population in human history. While as recently as in 1960 the vast majority of women 
of reproductive age had never been to school and only very few had had at least junior 
secondary education (the consequences of this can still be seen among elderly women 
in Figure 1), today young Korean women are among the best educated in the world with 
already more than half of the younger cohorts having completed college education. 
There is little doubt that this most impressive educational expansion has been one of the 
key factors behind the astonishing economic growth which followed soon thereafter 
(Lutz, Cuaresma, and Sanderson 2008).  
Nevertheless, the picture presented in Figure 1 has given rise to very different 
conclusions concerning the future socioeconomic prospects of South Korea. Some see 
the tremendous aging and the associated increase in the conventional old-age-
dependency ratio as an implication of doom, if not economic collapse, for the future. 
Others point at the stunning increases in education and assume that in a likely future of 
high tech industries, the Korean labour market will need fewer and much better 
educated young people. Who is right? These differing views also result in opposing 
policy recommendations. Given that highly educated Korean women have difficulty 
finding an equally or better educated male partner and often reject the traditional role as 
a housewife (Choe and Retherford 2009), some of those primarily concerned about the 
low fertility blame, in part, higher female education for this trend.  
In scientific terms, the question refers to the trade-offs between age-structure and 
education structure in terms of their contributions to current and future wellbeing. This 
is the main topic of this paper. Let us assume for the moment that fertility is a policy 
variable and we can choose among different hypothetical future pathways. Which 
average level of fertility should we see as most desirable in terms of being in the best 
long-term interest of society? (“Long-term” referring here to the next decades, through 
the end of this century.) One argument often mentioned in favour of RLF is that in the 
very long run (over several centuries or millennia), any other level would result either 
in population explosion or in eradication. But it seems to make little sense to argue with 
possible consequences many centuries down the road when the task is to assess the 
implications of fertility levels in the near-term future. Given the still unknown 
technologies and socioeconomic conditions of those future days, we can leave the task 
of looking at those consequences that go well beyond our current century to our great 
grandchildren, who should figure out for themselves what they see as the optimal 
fertility in the 22nd century. 
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It is surprising that this highly relevant question of the criteria for the desirability 
of different fertility levels among low-fertility societies has hardly been  posed by 
demographers thus far. Whether or not countries such as South Korea should launch 
major and possibly very expensive efforts to increase the birth rate depends first and 
foremost on the question of what is considered a desirable level of fertility. Unless this 
is to be left entirely to politically intuitive or emotional factors, there must be clearly 
specified criteria for assessing this question. The abundant literature on the century-old 
discussion of optimal population size has been inconclusive up to the present date. Joel 
Cohen’s impressive book entitled “How many people can the world support?” (Cohen 
1995) presents and discusses a wealth of different estimates and criteria for optimality 
of population size, but it also fails to give a clear answer to the question posed in the 
title, primarily because of the uncertainty about the technologies to be assumed for the 
longer-term future. But the question asked in this paper about which fertility rate would 
be most desirable in terms of long-term social welfare is less a question about 
population size – which enters only indirectly – and more one about desirable 
population structures in terms of the implied dependency ratios. 
The goal of our paper therefore is to first define possible criteria for preferring one 
level of fertility over others. These criteria are then operationalized in a quantitative 
model in the following sections. Section 3 introduces the age-dependency model and 
the basic assumptions with the results presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents a 
detailed sensitivity analysis with some of the key model parameters. In Section 6 we 
add the climate change dimension to our analysis of the desirable rate of fertility. The 
paper concludes with a discussion. 
 
 
2. Criteria of optimality 
Any discussion of what should be considered an optimal level of fertility (OLF) must 
be very clear and explicit with respect to the optimality criteria used. In the context of 
current low-fertility populations, most of the concern in the discussion of demographic 
trends relates to the economic and social consequences of population ageing, addressed 
in the recent demographic literature in terms of a major expected increase in the old-
age-dependency ratio which is also often seen as the closing of a demographic window 
of opportunity (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2003; Cutler et al. 1990; Lee and Mason 
2006). Other things being equal, it can be assumed that a lower dependency burden is 
associated with higher per capita well-being because the same economic production 
generated by the working age population must be shared with fewer children and 
elderly who are not of working age. 
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But an increase in the age-dependency burden can also be triggered by above-
replacement rates of fertility. In the context of our question about the desirable level of 
fertility, this is just the other side of the coin. Both below-replacement and above-
replacement levels of fertility have in common that they can lead to an unbalanced 
population age-structure, which in the long run places population policies under 
pressure.  
Since Bloom and Williamson (1998) began to focus on the relationship between 
age-structure change and economic growth, thus explicitly introducing age as a relevant 
source of population heterogeneity into the analysis, the now widely used and 
popularized concept of the demographic dividend refers only to changes in age-
dependency ratios, whose evolution over the course of the demographic transition 
presumably results in a demographic window that first opens and then closes in a 
predictable way as the old-age-dependency ratio starts to increase (UNFPA 2011). 
However, such theoretical reasoning about the future dependency burden due to 
fertility-induced reductions in the size of the labour force still misses an important point 
as long as education is not factored in. Bloom and Williamson explicitly included 
education as an independent variable yielding significantly positive effects, yet they did 
not discuss the importance of education in depth.  
Lutz et al. (2008) extended the demographic dividend model. First, by 
distinguishing two mechanisms for human capital to influence economic growth: (1) 
through the direct effect of the productivity of workers and (2) indirectly through its 
effect on the rate of total factor productivity growth. Second, they used a new education 
database (Lutz et al. 2007) that was more consistent and more detailed than previous 
data sources to disaggregate education effects by both age and level of educational 
attainment. Using data for 101 countries over six 5-year periods from 1970–2000, they 
found that the direct productivity effect is particularly strong for older workers with 
secondary education, while younger workers with tertiary education have the greatest 
effect on the speed of total factor productivity growth. 
In line with this evidence and still within the context of the literature about the 
demographic dividend, in this paper we seek to show that when smaller future cohorts 
are better equipped with human capital than the ones in the labour market they are 
replacing, fertility should be well below RLF if the goal is to minimize the future 
dependency burden. This has been demonstrated for the theoretical case of a stable 
population by Lutz, Sanderson, and O’Neill (2004). Our goal is to greatly expand this 
initial analysis and conduct systematic sensitivity analyses along several dimensions: 
we assess the long-term impacts of a large number of alternative fertility levels with 
respect to different sets of education costs and benefits, different future education 
trajectories, and different possible pension systems with respect to replacement rates 
and pension ages. We also apply the model to the actual age and education structures of 
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real world populations over the 21st century rather than unrealistic steady states. In 
addition, we attempt to factor in the effects of population trends on greenhouse gas 
emissions and thus on climate change. 
In times of major concerns about global climate change, the possible impacts of 
different demographic trajectories on future paths of greenhouse gas emissions can be 
viewed as an additional criterion of the desirability of a certain level of fertility and as a 
relevant factor contributing to future societal wellbeing. With respect to this 
environmental dimension, there is generally little doubt that fewer people are 
considered to be better for the planet (Royal Society 2012). While there certainly are 
major challenges in trying to quantify this effect and in weighing it against the costs and 
benefits of population ageing, we can still conduct a first approximation to a combined 
criterion of optimality by presenting results for a reasonable range of possible weights 
on the criterion derived from both projected dependency and emissions levels. To 
demonstrate our results, we use the example of the EU-27 and China, because for these 
countries model-based calculations of the effects of alternative fertility levels on 
greenhouse gas emissions were available (compare O'Neill et al. 2010). 
Apart from the economic and the environmental perspective, there are of course 
other criteria in assessing the OLF. Viewed from the individual perspective, it appears 
to be “optimal” to follow a supposedly “natural” desire for a man and a woman to have 
two children together in order to replace themselves and hence continue living in their 
children (Lutz and Scherbov 2008). Yet it remains questionable whether minimizing the 
difference between desired and actual family size on the individual level also yields the 
most desirable aggregate level of fertility. Viewed from a nationalistic perspective, 
population becomes a relevant security factor where historically, a higher rate of 
fertility was considered to be preferable. Whether this remains to be the case today, is a 
matter of debate and depends on a range of other – not only demographic – factors 
(compare Fargues 2000 referring to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). Yet, while such 
nationalistic and individual level criteria clearly play an important role in our 
contemporary world, they cannot be operationalized in terms of internationally 
applicable criteria for optimal fertility.  
In the following, we focus on the economic and environmental aspects associated 
with the changing size and age-structure of the population while explicitly taking 
education into account. To suggest that future low-fertility societies can tackle the 
consequences of societal aging solely by raising fertility levels to RLF means to ignore 
the resulting acceleration of climate change, in particular when considering that in the 
rich countries per capita emissions are significantly higher than in the poorer countries. 
Here again, education may play an important role. On the climate change mitigation 
side it is plausible to assume that at a given level of income more educated people move 
to cleaner technologies more quickly (Sharygin 2013), while at the adaptation side, the 
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role of education in enhancing societies’ capacities to adapt to climate change has 
recently been shown by Striessnig and Lutz (2013).  
 
 
3. Methods and data 
In order to assess the welfare impact of different long-term levels of fertility, we use a 
simple population projection model that enables us to calculate education-weighted 
dependency ratios (EWDR), based on observed initial (2010) population structures, 
survival probabilities as reported by the UN Population Division (2010), as well as 
different exogenous population projections by educational attainment developed at the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the Vienna Institute 
of Demography (VID) (KC et al. 2010). We are well aware that the educational 
trajectory of every society impacts its fertility, as was first stressed within the context of 
a dynamic equilibrium model by (Barro and Becker, 1989) and empirically proven by 
numerous other studies (Cochrane 1979; Cochrane, Khan and Osheba 1990; Bongaarts 
2010; Skirbekk and KC 2012). In fact, these considerations have been at the heart of 
many of the recent writings on education-specific population projections (Lutz and KC 
2011). Yet, in this particular paper we are interested in the long-term consequences of 
different fixed rates of fertility given certain exogenously provided narratives for the 
future of education. These narratives are provided through the scenarios of the 
IIASA/VID projections and will be described in detail later on.  
In accordance with the education projections, we divide the population into four 
education categories (none, primary, secondary, and tertiary – where for Europe the 
first category is irrelevant), applying different weights to each of them both with regard 
to the dependency burden due to the cost of education and to differential support 
(considering education-specific productivity) that people of working age can supply for 
those not of working age. This is simply an extension of the conventional total 
dependency ratio in which the strong and unrealistic assumption is made that every 
person of working age will make the same contribution to the support of the dependent 
population. The optimal level of fertility is the TFR, which in the long run shows the 
lowest level of the EWDR. 
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𝐸𝑊𝐷𝑅 = 𝐸𝑊𝐶 + 𝑅
𝐸𝑊𝑊  
𝐸𝑊𝐶 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙0−5 ∗ 𝑒𝑑0𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚6−10 ∗ 𝑒𝑑1𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑐11−18 ∗ 𝑒𝑑2𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡+ 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡19−25 ∗ 𝑒𝑑3𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝐸𝑊𝑊 = 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚16−57 ∗ 𝑒𝑑1𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 +  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑐19−61 ∗ 𝑒𝑑2𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 +  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡26−65 ∗ 𝑒𝑑3𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
𝑅 =  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚58+ ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 +  𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑐62+ ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡66+ ∗ 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
 
In the calculation of the education-weighted workforce (𝐸𝑊𝑊), 𝑒𝑑1𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 
refers to the weight given to working age people with only primary education (this is 
usually set to 1.0), 𝑒𝑑2𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 refers to those with at least junior secondary and 
𝑒𝑑3𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 to those who have at least a completed first-level tertiary education. While 
there had previously been some ambiguity around the specific effect of education on 
economic growth (i.e., Krueger and Lindahl 2000; Pritchett 2001), more recent 
literature which also considers the age-structure of human capital yields clear evidence 
that in virtually every society the more educated are more productive in economic terms 
and contribute more to macro-economic growth (Lutz, Cuaresma and Sanderson 2008; 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 2010; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos 2011). This effect 
is captured here by giving the better educated higher weights when calculating the 
denominator of the EWDR.3 In the figures below, the specific assumptions made are 
listed in the box on the upper left. In all other respects this analysis makes the same 
simplifying assumption as the usual dependency ratios (that everyone of working age 
who no longer attends school is in the labour force, there is no unemployment, etc.). 
As far as the dependents (numerator of the EWDR) are concerned, retirees (𝑅) all 
get the same weight (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡, here assumed to be 1), but the ages of labour market 
entry and exit are education-specific. In other words, uneducated and primary-educated 
people are assumed to move from the numerator of the dependency ratio to the 
denominator after age 15, secondary-educated after age 18, and tertiary-educated follow 
at the age of 25. In accordance with UNESCO (2009), we also assume that those 
receiving secondary and tertiary education require a higher educational input after the 
                                                          
3 The specific weights at this stage are chosen rather arbitrarily because there is only fragmentary empirical 
evidence on the many different channels through which education affects productivity. As we are taking the 
simplifying assumption that everybody of working age is in the labor force while labor force participation 
does, in fact, depend strongly on educational attainment, these weights must be seen as including more than 
just productivity. But as a sensitivity analysis shows in the following, the optimum does not respond greatly 
to the choice of these weights. Rather they affect the level of the dependency ratio. 
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age of 10. The assumed values for education-weighted children (𝐸𝑊𝐶) in the figure 
below are listed under 𝑒𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 where – just as in the traditional dependency ratio – the 
cost is 1.0 for everybody up to age 10. It is then increased to 𝑒𝑑2𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 for those with 
secondary education up to age 18 and to 𝑒𝑑3𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 for those going on to study to age 
25.4  
But education has benefits as well as costs. When retiring from the labour market 
and thus returning to the numerator, the primary-educated are initially assumed to make 
the transition at the age of 57, secondary educated retire at 61, and tertiary educated at 
65. These assumptions roughly resemble the current empirical evidence from Europe 
(Heckman and Jacobs 2010). However, current trends across the continent strongly 
suggest these ages will increase over the coming decades. Therefore, as life expectancy 
goes up in our model, following the medium scenario of the UN (2010), the labour 
market exit is also delayed in parallel.5  
Adding the climate change dimension to our analysis, we examine how different 
fertility levels affect future wellbeing through their impacts on carbon emissions, which 
can be seen as another criterion for determining the OLF in the sense of socially 
desirable fertility. In doing so, we rely on the model-based aggregate level carbon 
emission projections kindly produced for us by Brian O’Neill and his colleagues at the 
National Center For Atmospheric Research (NCAR) following the methodology 
described in O'Neill et al. (2010). These emission projections are currently sensitive to 
differences in urbanization and household size resulting from different fertility rates but 
not to the education structure of the population. We are thus missing potential feedback 
from different education scenarios on the resulting levels of emissions. To date there is 
very little scientific evidence on this question. 
In the final step of our analysis, we combine the two criteria of optimality and 
weigh the environmental consequences of human reproduction against the costs and 
benefits arising from the ageing dimension. Because it is impossible to know the extent 
to which future generations will emphasize climate change in their calculus of the 
socially desirable level of emissions, we can only assume different levels of intensity. 
But no matter how strong an importance we assign to the climate change argument in 
our joint criterion of optimality, the resulting OLF will always lie below what has been 
found to be optimal under the merely economic criterion of education-weighted 
dependency. 
                                                          
4 As UNESCO did not provide us with cost estimates for the entire EU-27 or China, for our baseline results at 
least we assumed German education costs and provide sensitivity analysis with regard to this assumption later 
on. 
5 A detailed sensitivity analysis for the case in which pension ages do not respond to increases in life 
expectancy is presented in the sensitivity section. For simplicity, the retirement ages are assumed to be the 
same for men and women, but this could easily be changed, as could all of the other assumptions on weights 
and transition ages. Table A 1 of the Appendix summarizes all of our baseline assumptions. 
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4. Results 
In the context of real world populations with non-stable age distributions, the time 
dimension becomes extremely important in this exercise. If the time horizon for 
optimization is only 10 or 20 years, the fertility level that minimizes the dependency 
ratio is very different from that under a longer time horizon. In all the following figures 
it was assumed that the fertility will move from its current level to the target level 
(listed on the TFR-axis) by 2030 and then remains constant. The standard assumption 
used here for all education trends is the global education trend (GET) scenario – defined 
as a mildly optimistic baseline in the IIASA/VID education projections. It assumes a 
further improving trend following those countries that are already more advanced in 
their educational structure with tertiary education assumed to level off at a maximum 
proportion of 60% of a cohort. Our baseline results for the EU-27 and China are given 
in Figure 2.  
As shown in Figure 2 (a) and (b), extremely low fertility turns out to be optimal for all 
time horizons in which these fewer children do not yet affect the size of the labour force 
but only bring down young age-dependency. Under such a short time horizon, not to 
have any children is best. Such a policy decreases the dependency ratio, but is of course 
very short-sighted because it will begin to starve the economy of workers 15 years later. 
As can be seen in the second half of the century, the pattern of an inverted U-shape 
appears which characterizes the graphs for the longer run. It is also interesting to note 
that the curve inclines more steeply to the left for cases of extremely low fertility and 
somewhat slower to the right for cases of high fertility. The OLF is also indicated for 
different points in time in the box in the lower right corner. 
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Figure 2: Education-Weighted Dependency Ratio (EWDR) for different Total 
Fertility Rates (TFR) for Global Education Trend (GET) – Scenario. 
Baseline for (a) EU-27 and (b) China with lines at 2030 to 2100 
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Figure 3 goes further into detail by showing the total fertility rates minimizing 
dependency in every year up until 2150 for the EU-27 and China. As we shall see, in 
the GET-scenario for any year these levels of TFR are well below RLF.  
 
Figure 3: Optimal Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for the EU-27 and China for 
Global Education Trend (GET), individual years 2020-2150 
 
 
 
5. Sensitivity 
What if the educational system does not, as assumed in the GET-Scenario, continue to 
expand over the course of the 21st century but rather shows stagnation? As we do not 
look at the dynamic case where the chances of an expansion in educational attainment 
depend on the level of fertility but assume fixed shares of population within different 
education groups, in our next step we are looking at the sensitivity of the EWDR with 
respect to alternative educational structures of the population. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4 for the cases of the EU-27 and China where we compare our baseline scenario 
with the CER (Constant Enrolment Rate) – Scenario. It assumes constant education 
levels based on current (2010) age-specific school enrolment rates. This implies that 
among future young cohorts the share of the matriculated population at any level of 
educational attainment will remain constant at the current (2010) level. Nevertheless, 
the overall educational composition of the population will improve slightly over several 
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decades due to preexisting intercohort discrepancies in educational attainment as 
younger, typically better educated cohorts replace the older, less educated ones. 
The picture clearly shows that the optimal TFR is lower in a population with 
higher average education. Whereas in Europe it decreases from an average of 1.98 to 
1.79 children, switching from CER to GET, in China the OLF is down from 1.9 to 1.68 
children. This reduction is rather insensitive to the choice of the relative productivity 
weights. It is primarily due to two effects: the increased total education cost which 
makes children more expensive and the increased average age of retirement which in 
the optimum requires a smaller number of children to pay for a smaller number of 
future pensioners. 
 
 
Figure 4: The effect of alternative education trajectories. Education-Weighted 
Dependency Ratio (EWDR) for different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 
and resulting Optimal Level of Fertility (OLF) for the Global 
Education Trend (GET) and Constant Enrollment Rate (CER) 
scenarios in 2100 for the EU-27 and China 
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But the OLF does not just depend on the education scenario. Figure 5 shows its 
sensitivity to our assumptions about how additional life years will be used in the future. 
One might even question that life expectancy will go up in the future but we do not 
consider this possibility for the moment. Rather, we take a look at what happens to our 
measure of social wellbeing when we keep pension ages constant in spite of the fact 
that life expectancy goes up (dashed line) or assume that only half of the gains in life 
expectancy will be time spent in the denominator of the EWDR, whereas the other half 
is additional time spent in retirement (dotted line). 
Again, a smaller share of additional life years spent working not only raises the 
level of dependency, it also has a strong effect on the OLF. If only half the gain in life 
expectancy becomes a gain in working years, then the mean age at retirement in 2100 
would be roughly 3 years lower than in the baseline case and the OLF would be 1.93. In 
the extreme case, if pension ages are entirely inelastic with respect to life expectancy, 
the retirement age stagnates, making a TFR of 2.05 optimal. Turning the rationale 
around, if fertility cannot easily be stimulated, effective pension ages will have to 
increase in order to maximize welfare.  
 
Figure 5: The effect of alternative assumptions regarding future life 
expectancy gains. Education-Weighted Dependency Ratio (EWDR) 
for different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) and resulting Optimal Level 
of Fertility (OLF) in 2100 for the EU-27 
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Apart from the education scenario, our results also crucially depend on the 
parameter values assumed for pension payments, cost of education, and productivity 
weights. The baseline assumption with regard to the pension cost is the model of the 
“Volkspension” in which the government provides comparatively equal low levels of 
pension payments which then can be supplemented through individual savings. This is 
close to what we see in the USA or in Scandinavian countries. However, the OLF might 
be different when looking at a system with a fixed pension replacement rate which is 
linked to previous labour income. This is the sensitivity analysis that is presented in 
Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: The effect of alternative pension schemes. Education-Weighted 
Dependency Ratio (EWDR) for different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 
and resulting Optimal Level of Fertility (OLF) in 2100 for the EU-27 
 
 
It is interesting to see that when the pension rate is 100 per cent and retiring does 
not lead to a loss in income, the resulting OLF coincides with RLF. Such a high pension 
rates is however rather untypical, and so we assumed a range of lower pension rates 
which all lead both to lower levels of fertility in the optimum, but also to a lower level 
of dependency and thus to higher welfare in the optimum. 
The values assumed for the education cost in the baseline case are empirically 
grounded (compare UNESCO 2009) and correspond to the costs observed at different 
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schooling levels in those European countries for which data is available. One might 
argue that these values do not properly reflect the situation in China or even the EU-27. 
In Figure 7, therefore, we compare our baseline results with the cases of 20 per cent 
lower and higher costs of education, respectively. 
 
Figure 7: The effect of alternative education costs. Education-Weighted 
Dependency Ratio (EWDR) for different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 
and resulting Optimal Level of Fertility (OLF) in 2100 for the EU-27 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis reveals that if children are assumed to be 20 per cent more 
expensive in terms of their education, comparing the solid line with the dotted line, the 
fertility level associated with the lowest dependency falls even lower. This is, of course, 
disregarding the possibility of more expensive education also being better quality 
education and thus leading to greater gains in productivity later on. Lower education 
costs lead to a higher OLF. 
Finally, we want to look at the sensitivity with regard to the education-specific 
productivity weights. Here the assumptions behind our baseline results were chosen 
rather arbitrarily. Yet, as we show in Figure 8, the optimum does not respond greatly to 
the choice of these weights. Rather, they affect the level of the dependency ratio and the 
stronger education is assumed to affect productivity of those participating in the work 
force, the lower the level of dependency in the optimum. 
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Figure 8: The effect of alternative productivity weights. Education-Weighted 
Dependency Ratio (EWDR) for different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 
and resulting Optimal Level of Fertility (OLF) in 2100 for the EU-27 
 
 
 
6. Adding the climate change dimension 
In times of major concerns about global climate change, the possible impacts of 
different demographic trajectories on future paths of greenhouse gas emissions and on a 
future generation’s ability to cope with the expected negative consequences of climate 
change also must be taken into consideration. In order to assess what these different 
long-term levels of fertility mean in terms of carbon emissions, but also to find out how 
considering these affects the OLF, we will now combine our results from Section 4 with 
those obtained from the PET (Population-Environment-Technology) model (compare 
O'Neill et al. 2010). PET is a dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the 
global economy divided into nine regions. It has a basic economic structure that is 
representative of the state of the art in emissions scenario modelling. Results based on 
different fertility scenarios for the EU-27 and China, fitted with a cubic smoothing 
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spline (Chambers and Hastie 1992), are shown in Figure 9 below.6 As can be seen here, 
carbon emissions do not decrease linearly with fertility. This is due to the fact that 
energy consumption in PET is linked not only to the absolute number of people that 
arises from different levels of fertility, but also on urbanization and the number of 
households. As fertility goes down, the number of households declines at a slower rate 
than the population due to population ageing and the fact that many elderly tend to live 
alone. 
 
Figure 9: CO2-emissions for the EU-27 and China in 2100 following from 
different long-term fertility levels 
 
Source of original data: PET-Model (cf. O'Neill et al. 2010) 
 
 
  
                                                          
6 While in Figure 9 the data points for UN-Med and UN-High come directly from the O’Neill et al. paper 
(following the fertility paths over time as assumed by the UN), the results for 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5 for China and 
the EU stem from special model runs by O’Neill and colleagues as presented in the opening plenary of the 
European Population Conference 2010 in Vienna. 
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If we were to care only about this environmental dimension, there would be little 
doubt that fewer people would be better and the resulting OLF would be zero. Yet it is 
unreasonable that when weighing the social cost of aging against the environmental cost 
of human reproduction, any future society will place a weight of 100% on the 
environmental dimension and zero weight on the aging dimension. To be conservative, 
our results presented in Figure 10 do not assume a weight of more than 20% for the 
environmental dimension. But even when we do not place a heavy weight on the 
resulting level of emissions, there is a downward effect on the OLF, both for the EU-27 
and China. 
 
Figure 10: Joint criterion of optimality. Education-Weighted Dependency Ratio 
(EWDR) times Emissions with 5 different weighing schemes for 
different Total Fertility Rates (TFR) and resulting Optimal Level of 
Fertility (OLF) for the EU-27 and China in 2100 
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Table 1 summarizes the results of different weights applied to the combination of 
the two optimality criteria, EWDR and greenhouse gas emissions. In a society which 
cares exclusively about aging, meaning zero weight on emissions, the results are 
identical to those presented in the earlier part of the paper. If emissions are given a 
weight of 0.20 and the EWDR of 0.80, respectively, then the resulting OLF for the year 
2100 turns out to be lower by about a quarter of one child: 1.51 in Europe and 1.41 in 
China. As the right hand side of the table indicates, the optimum is rather flat when 
looking at dependency, meaning this lower OLF comes at the expense of a very small 
deterioration in the EWDR while resulting in huge reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions. At the same time, it is associated with substantially lower total population 
sizes by the end of this century. 
 
Table 1: Results for Global Education Trend (GET) Scenario,  
EU-27 and China in 2100 
Country 
Dependency 
Weight 
Emissions 
Weight OLF 
Emissions- 
Weighted 
Dependency 
Dependency 
Carbon 
Emissions 
(GtC/Yr) 
Population  
(in 1000) 
EU-27 
1.00 0.00 1.79 0.99 0.684 0.83 359487 
0.95 0.05 1.73 0.98 0.685 0.81 340683 
0.90 0.10 1.67 0.97 0.686 0.78 322587 
0.85 0.15 1.61 0.96 0.688 0.76 305181 
0.80 0.20 1.51 0.95 0.695 0.72 277666 
        
China 
1.00 0.00 1.68 0.97 0.601 1.90 884437 
0.95 0.05 1.62 0.96 0.602 1.81 832863 
0.90 0.10 1.55 0.94 0.604 1.69 775605 
0.85 0.15 1.48 0.92 0.608 1.58 721375 
0.80 0.20 1.41 0.90 0.614 1.46 670067 
 
 
 
7. Discussion7 
Many governments in Europe report that they are dissatisfied with the current levels of 
fertility in their countries in the sense that fertility is considered as being too low. The 
lower the level of recently observed period fertility, the stronger the expressed concern 
is. Also, the further one goes to the east of the continent, the stronger this publicly 
expressed concern. While the prime minister of Bulgaria calls his country’s 
                                                          
7 Part of this section was previously published by Wolfgang Lutz, as a commentary in VYPR 2008. 
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‘demographic crisis’ the number one policy priority, the president of Belarus even 
speaks of a national ‘demographic security crisis’, implying that this may require 
equally drastic action as a security crisis at the military level. Less dramatic in tone but 
equally urgent in its message, the President of the European Commission repeatedly 
called Europe’s demographic trends one of the three main challenges facing Europe, the 
other two being globalisation and technological change.8 
In the global-level policy debate, the notion of ‘population stabilisation’ has been 
the guiding principle and the explicit goal of virtually all population-related policies for 
decades, both within the United Nations system and outside. The international political 
goal of population stabilisation corresponds nicely to the UN population projections 
which used to assume that in the longer run all countries of the world would converge 
in their fertility rates to replacement level, resulting (in combination with an assumed 
levelling-off of life expectancy) in a long-term stabilization, i.e. a constant size of the 
world population as well as of the population of all individual countries. Such a 
perceived future of population stabilisation is likely to please government officials who 
do not want to see their population as either disappearing or exploding in the long run. 
The only problem with this politically attractive concept is that the empirical evidence 
from the past decades does not seem to support it. With very few exceptions (including 
France and the US) most countries went well below replacement level, once they had 
reached this level. This trend is particularly strong in East Asia, affecting a quarter of 
the world population. As to the future, fertility trends are highly uncertain. 
In this paper, we first looked at the effect of different long-term fertility 
assumptions combined with alternative education trajectories on levels of education-
weighted dependency in the context of population ageing. We also provided an 
extensive and systematic sensitivity analysis with respect to different possible 
education-specific productivity weights, education costs, and pension systems. This 
simulation exercise helped us to assess the long-term level of welfare (measured in 
terms of education-weighted dependency ratios) as a function of future fertility levels, 
future education trajectories, and different pension systems. The results show that 
generally the highest welfare levels are reached under high education combined with 
relatively low government granted pension entitlements and fertility levels that are well 
below replacement level,  
In a further step, we added the effect of fertility on total greenhouse gas emissions 
in countries that are big per capita polluters. Here the effect is very straightforward in 
the sense that relatively higher fertility leads to higher total population size and at any 
given level of per capita emissions to higher total greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, if 
this were the only criterion, optimal fertility would go to zero. When combined with the 
                                                          
8 Source: José Manuel Barroso in his video address delivered at the opening of the European Population 
Conference in Barcelona, 9 July 2008. 
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age-dependency criterion, the outcome depends on the relative weights attached to the 
two. But universally, the optimal level of fertility comes out lower when the 
environmental effect is also factored in.  
When trying to judge whether for any particular country the current period fertility 
level is to be considered as too low, the impact of migration also has to be taken into 
account – an aspect which in this simulation exercise was intentionally left out because 
it would only further complicate the picture. But to some extent migration gains do 
indeed compensate for low fertility levels, and the populations of several Western 
European countries are currently still growing despite experiencing more deaths than 
births. In this respect, even without the above described age-dependency considerations 
of heterogeneous populations, optimal fertility would lie below replacement level if 
there was a constant gain of younger migrants. And the higher the education level of 
those migrants, the better it would be for the given welfare indicator. 
In a nutshell these simulations suggest that – under the specified criteria – current 
fertility levels in countries such as Germany and Austria, where fertility is generally 
said to be too low, can be seen as being about right; whereas they may be considered as 
being too high in countries like France and the US. This finding is certainly opposite to 
widely held perceptions. While much more research is undoubtably needed on this 
important and complex topic, our main goal in this paper was to open up a new field of 
discussion and analysis around the question of whether the welfare decline caused by 
rising dependency ratios could be counterbalanced in part by the improved education of 
smaller young cohorts. The first very tentative results seem to suggest that perhaps 
longer-term fertility levels somewhere between 1.5 and 1.8 are the best for our planet 
and will, at the same time, result in future higher welfare as long as we invest more in 
the education of our slowly declining number of children. 
  
Striessnig & Lutz: Optimal Fertility 
488  http://www.demographic-research.org 
References 
Barro, R.J. and Becker, G.S. (1989). Fertility Choice in a Model of Economic-Growth. 
Econometrica 57(2): 481−501. doi:10.2307/1912563. 
Bloom, D.E., Canning, D., and Sevilla, J. (2003). The demographic dividend: a new 
perspective on the economic consequences of population change. Santa Monica: 
Rand Corp. 
Bloom, D.E. and Williamson, J.G. (1998). Demographic transitions and economic 
miracles in emerging Asia. World Bank Economic Review 12(3): 419−455. 
doi:10.1093/wber/12.3.419. 
Bongaarts, J. (2010). The causes of educational differences in fertility in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 8: 31−50. doi:10.1553/ 
populationyearbook2010s31. 
Carneiro, P., Heckman, J.J., and Vytlacil, E.J. (2010). Estimating marginal returns to 
education. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research (No. 16474). 
doi:10.3386/w16474. 
Chambers, J.M. and Hastie, T. (1992). Statistical models in S. Pacific Grove, Calif.: 
Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole Advanced Books & Software. 
Choe, M.K. and Retherford, R.D. (2009). The contribution of education to South 
Korea's fertility decline to 'lowest-low' level. Asian Population Studies 5(3): 
267−288. 
Cochrane, S.H. (1979). Fertility and Education. What Do We Really Know? Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Cochrane, S.H., Khan, M.A., and Osheba, I.K.T. (1990). Education, income, and 
desired fertility in Egypt: A revised perspective. Economic Development and 
Cultural Change : 313−339. doi:10.1086/451795. 
Cohen, J.E. (1995). How many people can the Earth support? New York: Norton. 
Cutler, D.M., Poterba, J.M., Sheiner, L.M., Summers, L.H., and Akerlof, G.A. (1990). 
An aging society: opportunity or challenge? Brookings papers on economic 
activity 1990(1): 1−73. doi:10.2307/2534525. 
Fargues, P. (2000). Protracted national conflict and fertility change: Palestinians and 
Israelis in the twentieth century. Population and Development Review 26(3): 
441−482. doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2000.00441.x. 
Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article  16 
http://www.demographic-research.org  489 
Heckman, J.J. and Jacobs, B. (2010). Policies to Create and Destroy Human Capital in 
Europe. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research (No. 15742). 
KC, S., Barakat, B., Goujon, A., Skirbekk, V., and Lutz, W. (2010). Projection of 
populations by level of educational attainment, age, and sex for 120 countries for 
2005-2050. Demographic Research 22(15): 383−472. 
Krueger, A.B. and Lindahl, M. (2000). Education for growth: why and for whom? 
Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research (No. 7591). 
Lee, R. and Mason, A. (2006). What is the demographic dividend? Finance and 
Development 43(3): 16. 
Lee, R. and Mason, A. (2010). Fertility, Human Capital, and Economic Growth over 
the Demographic Transition. European Journal of Population 26(2): 159−182. 
doi:10.1007/s10680-009-9186-x. 
Lutz, W., Cuaresma, J.C., and Sanderson, W.C. (2008). The Demography of 
Educational Attainment and Economic Growth. Science 319(5866): 1047−1048. 
doi:10.1126/science.1151753. 
Lutz, W., Goujon, A., KC, S., and Sanderson, W.C. (2007). Reconstruction of 
populations by age, sex and level of educational attainment for 120 countries for 
1970-2000. Vienna Yearbook of Population Research 2007 5: 193−235. 
doi:10.1553/populationyearbook2007s193. 
Lutz, W. and KC, S. (2011). Global Human Capital: Integrating Education and 
Population. Science 333(6042): 587−592. doi:10.1126/science.1206964. 
Lutz, W., Sanderson, W.C., and O'Neill, B.C. (2004). Conceptualizing Population in 
Sustainable Development: From "Population Stabilization" to "Population 
Balance". In: Lutz, W., Sanderson, W.C., and O'Neill, B.C. (eds.). The End of 
World Population Growth in the 21st Century: New Challenges for Human 
Capital Formation and Sustainable Development. London: Earthscan: 315−334. 
Lutz, W. and Scherbov, S. (2008). Exploratory Extension of IIASA's World Population 
Projections: Scenarios to 2300. Laxenburg, Austria: IIASA, IIASA Interim 
Report IR-08-022. 
O'Neill, B.C., Dalton, M., Fuchs, R., Jiang, L., Pachauri, S., and Zigova, K. (2010). 
Global demographic trends and future carbon emissions. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107(41): 
17521−17526. doi:10.1073/pnas.1004581107. 
Striessnig & Lutz: Optimal Fertility 
490  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Patrinos, H.A. and Psacharopoulos, G. (2011). Education: past, present and future 
global challenges. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Pritchett, L. (2001). Where Has All the Education Gone? The World Bank Economic 
Review 15(3): 367−391. doi:10.1093/wber/15.3.367. 
Royal Society (2012). People and the planet. London: The Royal Society. 
Sharygin, E. (2013). The Carbon Cost of an Educated Future: A Consumer Lifestyle 
Approach. Vienna, Austria: Vienna Institute of Demography (No. 1304). 
Skirbekk, V. and KC, S. (2012). Fertility-reducing dynamics of women's social status 
and educational attainment. Asian Population Studies 8(3): 251−264. 
doi:10.1080/17441730.2012.714667. 
Striessnig, E., Lutz, W., and Patt, A.G. (2013). Effects of educational attainment on 
climate risk vulnerability. Ecology and Society 18(1): 16. doi:10.5751/ES-
05252-180116. 
UN Population Division (2010). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision 
Population Database [electronic resource]. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/ 
panel_population.htm 
UN Population Division (2011). World fertility policies, 2011. New York: United 
Nations, Deptartment of Economic and Social Affairs. 
UNESCO (2009). Global Education Digest: Comparing Education Statistics Across the 
World, 2009. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
UNFPA (2011). Impact of demographic change in Thailand. Bangkok, Thailand: 
United Nations Population Fund. 
Vobecká, J., Butz, W.P., and Reyes, G.C. (2013). Population Trends and Policies in the 
UNECE Region: Outcomes, Policies and Possibilities. Laxenburg: UNFPA and 
IIASA. 
 
 
  
Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article  16 
http://www.demographic-research.org  491 
Appendix 
Table A 1:  Assumed baseline parameter values 
  No Education Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Education cost 1 1.19 1.25 1.3 
Productivity weight 1 1 1.25 1.5 
Pension cost 1 1 1 1 
Labour market entry age 15 15 19 26 
Labour market exit age 57 57 61 65 
Share of life-years Gained 
spent working 
1 1 1 1 
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